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1. INTRODUCTION
Having been inadvertently frozen in a cryogenic chamber for 1,000
years, Philip J. Fry finds himself facing the all-too-common fictional
dilemma of adjusting to life in the distant future. Unequipped for the
31st Century, Fry joins the rag-tag group of humans, mutants, robots,
Martians, and anthropomorphic crustaceans that work for Planet
Express, one of New New York's less reputable parcel carriers. Led by
Professor Hubert J. Farnsworth, Fry's great-great-great-great-great-
great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-
great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-
great nephew, the Planet Express crew supplies Fry with a job and a
1. J.D., University of Miami School of Law; B.A., University of California, San Diego.
This paper is (not literally) the least I could do. Matt Groening, David X. Cohen, Al Jean, and
the (many, many) other writers of The Simpsons and Futurama have shaped the way I think of
humor, politics, religion, and culture in a way that is likely not unique to members of my
generation. Since (almost literally) my birth, I have been exposed to, and influenced by, their
writing, and, as all great art does, it has inspired me both artistically and intellectually. With
Futurama having recently come to an(other) end, I wanted to send it off the only way I know
how-with a lengthy, esoteric, and likely to-go-unread law review article. I would like to thank
the University of Miami Law Review for agreeing to publish this ridiculous paper, my fonfon ru
Eva for a lot of things, Dr. John D. Zoidberg and Joshua Plager for a few things, and Joseph Ho
for nothing. Ever. He knows what he did.
To find out more about me, including what I do when I am not watching cartoons, visit
www.justinwales.com. If by some chance a Simpsons or Futurama writer ends up reading this
article, thank you. Your work has made the world smrter.
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chance of surviving the post-post 2 apocalyptical world that is the year
3000. Simply stated, that is the plot of Futurama, the second most popu-
lar animated series created by Matt Groening.
Much has been written about Futurama's connections to the fields
of math and science. Dozens of websites are dedicated to explaining the
countless mathematic and scientific in-jokes and references hidden in
the series, and the show has even been credited in creating a mathe-
matical proof that proves the properties of an irreversible body swap
scenario.' That proof was written by Futurama writer and applied mathe-
matics Ph.D. Ken Keeler.' Used in the episode "The Prisoners of
Benda,"' and explained in the episode by fictional Harlem Globetrotters
and mathematicians, Ethan "Bubblegum" Tate and "Sweet" Clyde
Dixon, "The Futurama Theorem," as it has come to be known, was
implemented by the writers to save the Planet Express crew from a body
swap conundrum initiated by one of Professor Farnsworth's inventions.
That the show's writers are able to so often utilize such high-minded
plot devices into each episode led me to consider whether the topics and
issues presented in Futurama could be used to explore issues beyond the
scope of mathematics and science. Why, after all, should those nerds
have all the fun?
When viewed through the eyes of a J.D., Futurama challenges
many notions regarding the law and how we would expect-or hope-
the law to evolve over the next millennium. This article will use the
technological and sociological possibilities presented in Futurama as a
means of pushing the boundaries of jurisprudential analysis by finding
parallels to modem legal dilemmas and exploring how continued techni-
cal achievements might have an effect on how we view the law and
ourselves. By doing so, I hope to do for this article's readers what I
believe Futurama's writers do for its viewers: use the absurdity of the
show as a vehicle (likely a spaceship) for discussing important issues
about what life will be like in the future.
At 140 episodes, the number of philosophical and jurisprudential
issues that could be discussed in this article could produce an anthology
of interest. In order to narrow the paper's scope, I decided to explore a
2. First Destruction of New York City, INFOSPHERE.ORG (Oct. 24, 2012, 11:33), http://www.
theinfosphere.org/First Destruction of New York City.
3. Casey Chan, Futurama Writer Invented a New Math Theorem Just to Use in the Show,
GIZMODO.COM (Aug. 21, 2010, 12:30 PM), http://gizmodo.com/5618502/futurama-writer-inven
ted-a-new-math-theorem-just-to-use-in-the-show; see also Dana C. Ernst, Talk: The Futurama
Theorem and Some Refinements, DANAERNST.COM (Nov. 23, 2012), http://danaernst.com/talk-the-
futurama-theorem-and-some-refinements.
4. Chan, supra note 3.
5. Futurama: The Prisoner of Benda (FOX television broadcast Aug. 19, 2010).
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duo of issues concerning our existential understandings of life and death
in the future and how technological advancements may instigate a per-
ceptional change in human identity.
Part II of our discussion will begin with the legal and moral impli-
cations that may arise through advancements in the field of cryonics.
Working under the assumption that technology will eventually allow a
person to cryogenically preserve oneself for 1,000 years or more, funda-
mental legal and philosophical principles will require reevaluation. For
example, this article will examine whether a cryogenically frozen indi-
vidual should be deemed alive or dead in the eyes of society and the law.
If the law treats those individuals as alive, their existent status will
undoubtedly affect estate planning and force the reevaluation of many
settled issues of law. If considered dead, a bevy of questions will emerge
as to the individual's legal status upon reanimation. Part III of this arti-
cle will explore the implications upon both society and the law if science
is successful at genetically cloning a human being. Among the issues
discussed in this section are the rights and responsibilities of both donor
and clone, as well as the possible constitutional implications of govern-
ment regulation of the cloning process. This article will posit that the
possibility of human cloning will force drastic changes in our under-
standing of heirdom, parenthood, and fertility, but not necessarily in our
understanding of freedom or autonomy. Finally, Part IV will offer a con-
cluding thought on what it means to be human in a world of rapidly
changing technology, and will urge readers to use the pages (or DVDs)
of science fiction as a means of challenging our understanding of society
and the law. "Interesting Stuff! Stay tuned for more .... 
II. "WELCOME TO THE WORLD OF TOMORROW!"'
My god! It's the future! My parents! My coworkers! My girl-
friend ... I'll never see any of them again .. . YAHOO!!'
-Philip J. Fry
It is the curse of the human condition that we live with the knowl-
edge of our own mortality. Our fate is assigned: "[d]eath borders upon
our birth, and our cradle stands in the grave."9 But is the ability to
escape death completely out of our reach? According to Futurama's ver-
sion of the year 3000, the answer is no. In the Futurama universe, there
are at least two ways one can go about cheating death. One can either
6. Futurama: Anthology of Interest I (FOX television broadcast May 21, 2000).
7. Futurama: Space Pilot 3000 (FOX television broadcast Mar. 29, 1999).
8. Id.
9. HERBERT LOCKYER, LAST WORDS OF SAINTS AND SINNERS 9 (1969).
20131 89
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
best the Robot Devil in a fiddle-playing contest,' 0 or, alternatively, cryo-
genically preserve one's body for future reanimation with the hope that
whatever life-threatening ailment one currently suffers from will be
cured in the future."
While the eventual existence of Robot Hell is suspect, the practice
and study of cryonics is very much a real thing. At the time of this
article's publication, over 200 bodies1 2 have been preserved in one of
three non-profit cryopreservatories around the country." The choice to
cryogenically freeze one's body is a gamble on future generation's sci-
entific breakthroughs, and an expensive gamble at that. The costs of a
full-body preservation at the Alcor Life Extension Foundation, for
example, can bear costs exceeding $200,000.1' Alcor itself admits that
cryonics is a "speculative" practice" and Alcor's website displays
tongue-in-cheek quotes such as "Cryonics is an experiment. So far the
control group isn't doing very well." 6 Despite being a gamble, however,
it is not hard to imagine why someone with the means would make such
a bet. By offering the hope-no matter how small-that death may not
be a permanent destination, the thought and acceptance of our own mor-
tality may be easier to accept.
A. "You can solve all of life's problems by freezing them!""
We will begin our discussion by comparing the practices and proce-
dures of two cryonics facilities; one real, one imagined. Applied Cryo-
genics is Futurama's fictional cryonics facility. Originally located in
New York City," and dating back to at least 1997, Applied Cryogenics
offers its "patients" the chance to suspend their pre-mortem bodies in a
deep-freezing cryogenic chamber and provides services to its patients
10. Futurama: Hell is Other Robots (FOX television broadcast May 18, 1999).
11. Futurama: Space Pilot 3000 (FOX television broadcast Mar. 29, 1999). You will,
however, have to remember to take your Boneitus pills.
12. Comparing Procedures and Policies, CRYONICS.ORG, http://www.cryonics.org/compari
sons.html#Existing (last visited Apr. 1, 2013).
13. Id.
14. Cryopreservation Agreement - Schedule A: Required Costs and Cryopreservation Fund
Minimums, ALCOR.ORG, http://www.alcor.org/BecomeMember/scheduleA.html (last updated Jan.
1, 2013).
15. What is Cryonics?, ALCOR.ORG, http://www.alcor.org/AboutCryonics/index.html (last
visited Apr. 1, 2013).
16. Notable Quotes, ALCOR.ORG, http://www.alcor.org/notablequotes.html (last visited Apr. 1,
2013).
17. Applied Cryogenics, FuTURAMA.WiKi.com, http://futurama.wikia.com/wikilApplied-Cryo
genics (last visited Apr. 1, 2013).
18. The facility was relocated to New New York sometime after the city's destruction in
2308. See Futurama: Bender's Big Score (FOX television broadcast Nov. 27, 2007).
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upon reanimation to help them adjust to their new temporal existence.1 9
In contrast, real-life cryonics facilities, like the Alcor Life Extension
Foundation, which is located in Scottsdale, Arizona, offers patients the
opportunity to preserve their bodies and brains, or even pets,2 0 in liquid
nitrogen after the patient has been declared "legally dead."2 1 Its facility
is funded via an irrevocable Patient Care Trust, which was created in
1997.22 The trust holds the mortgage on Alcor's property, and its
remaining investments are held by Morgan Stanley.2 3 Included in the
fees patients pay to secure Alcor's services is the money that Alcor
places in trust for the financial sustainment of the facility's operation.2 4
Because of pesky state laws prohibiting homicide and assisted sui-
cide,25 Alcor is not a "cryonics" facility in the truest sense of the word,
but rather a "cryopreservation" facility.2 6 Modem cryonics attempts to
preserve a body after the body is pronounced "legally dead," but before
the body's organs lose all life sustaining capabilities.2 7 Often, this period
of time is extremely short-lasting mere minutes-but if a patient is
prepared within that time, blood, circulation, and breathing can be artifi-
cially restored and the patient can be preserved in liquid nitrogen while
still being "biologically viable."2 8 In other words, if a patient dies of a
heart attack, the "[c]ardiac death isn't a diagnosis of death, it is a prog-
nosis of death."29
Alcor's methods of preserving life before "biological death" are
based largely on the theories of Dr. Robert Ettinger, as set forth in his
influential book "The Prospect of Immortality." 0 While the realities of
reanimation are contentiously debated,3 1 modem science has advanced
19. After defrosting a patient, Applied Cryogenics employees examine the newly-defrosted
individual with a device known as the "probulator," and then implant a career chip into the
patient's hands which will confine the thawed patient to the job he or she is best suited to perform.
Futurama: Space Pilot 3000 (FOX television broadcast Mar. 29, 1999).
20. Frequently Asked Questions: Membership Questions, ALCOR.ORG, http://www.alcor.org/
FAQs/faq06.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2013).
21. Frequently Asked Questions: General Questions, ALCOR.ORG, http://www.alcor.org/
FAQs/faq01.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2013).
22. Frequently Asked Questions: Membership Questions, supra note 20.
23. Id.
24. Id. ("Alcor places $25,000 into the Trust for each neuropatient and $115,000 for each
whole body patient.").
25. See generally Adam A. Perlin, "To Die in Order to Live": The Need for Legislation
Governing Post-Mortem Cryonics Suspension, 36 Sw. U. L. REv. 33 (2007).
26. Frequently Asked Questions: Membership Questions, supra note 20.
27. Frequently Asked Questions: General Questions, supra note 21.
28. Cardiopulmonary Support in Cryonics, ALCOR.ORG, http://www.alcor.org/Library/html/
CardiopulmonarySupport.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2013).
29. Id.
30. ROBERT C.W. ETriNGER, THE PROSPECT OF IMMORTALTrrY (1964).
31. See, e.g., Robert L. Steinback, Frozen in Time, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 17, 2002, at lE.
912013]1 FUTURI.AWMA
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to the point where scientists can successfully cryogenically preserve
organs, blood, and embryos,32 and even revive a person after as long as
three-and-a-half hours of being declared clinically dead." While it is
uncertain whether Dr. Ettinger's theories on immortality are scientifi-
cally valid, such a discussion is beyond both the scope of this article and
the intelligence of its author. What we can say with some confidence,
however, is that "[a]lthough no one can quantify the probability of cry-
onics working ... certainly nobody can say it is zero." 34
B. "Why must you analyze everything with your relentless logic?"3 5
Continuing under the assumption that Dr. Ettinger's theories will
eventually be vindicated by science, fundamental beliefs concerning
mortality, death, and religion will need to be reevaluated. For the pur-
poses of this article, however, we will limit the scope of our inquiry to
two fundamental questions: What does it mean to die, and how must
society adapt to a fundamental change in that meaning? As we will see,
such questions are not easily answered.
Beliefs about death are deeply personal. Often rooted in faith and
religion, the confidence or uncertainty about what becomes of our soul
or spiritual life-force at death is not of our immediate concern. Philoso-
phers and religious leaders will certainly struggle with such questions if
cryonic reanimation becomes a reality, much as they have struggled with
such questions from time immemorial.
Compared to such divine inquiries, defining the moment life ceases
seems simple. According to medical standards, death occurs when a
body experiences "the permanent absence of respiration and circula-
tion." 6 Under such a definition, however, technologies that leave open
the likelihood of future reanimation could fundamentally alter our con-
cept of death. Because we can never be certain that at some point in the
future a scientific resurrection of our vitality will occur, permanence no
longer can be considered the deciding factor in determining death.
Bioethicists have struggled with the meaning of death and have,
throughout modern history, offered different biological definitions for
32. Ryan Sullivan, Pre-Mortem Cryopreservation: Recognizing a Patient's Right to Die in
Order to Live, 14 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 49, 55-56 (2010).
33. Cardiac Resuscitation After 3.5 Hours on 'Autopulse' Support Pump, ARWATCH.CO.UK,
http://arwatch.co.uk/2011/02/cardiac-resuscitation-after-3-5-hours-on-%E2%80%98autopulse%E
2%80%99-support-pump (last visited Apr. 1, 2013).
34. Notable Quotes, supra note 16.
35. Futurama: The Cryonic Woman (FOX television broadcast Dec. 3, 2000).
36. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. AND BIOMEDICAL
AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DEFINING DEATH: MEDICAL, LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE




the term." What remains constant in the various explanations of death,
however, is the idea of permanence. In this sense, "death is not an event,
nor even a process, but rather a prediction; a prediction that such and
such an individual will not be seen alive again."" If technology could
allow a legally or biologically "deceased" individual to be reanimated,
that individual's suspended state cannot truly be classified as "dead"
according to any accepted definition and must, at least semantically, be
distinguished.
C. "No! I want to live! There are still too many things
I don't own!"39
To better illustrate the problems with defining the present status of
a cryogenically preserved individual, let us create our own hypothetical.
Let's say a woman, we will call her Catherine, suffers from a terminal
illness that will undoubtedly cause her death within six months of diag-
nosis. Catherine is forty years old, has two young children, was prede-
ceased by her husband, and is the owner of a considerable estate.
Wishing to avoid the indignity of a slow death, Catherine contacts a
cryogenics facility and agrees to have her body cryogenically frozen
before both her legal and biological death in the hope that medical sci-
ence will eventually be able to cure her illness and she will be able to
resume her life in the future. In other words, according to a modern
understanding of the terms, Catherine "wishes to die in order to live."4 0
Under the current state of the law, Catherine faces a number of
challenges. While an individual may legally have his or her body cryo-
genically stored, 4 1 pre-mortem preservation still implicates pertinent
state interests in preventing homicide and suicide.42 The California
Court of Appeals, in a 1992 decision, rejected a declaratory petition by
mathematician Thomas K. Donaldson that would have recognized his
constitutional right to pre-mortem cryonic suspension. 43 Donaldson, like
our fictional character Catherine, was diagnosed with a terminal condi-
tion-an inoperable brain tumor-that would ultimately result in his
death."
Arguing that his "right to privacy and self-determination are para-
37. See generally id.
38. Thomas A. Robinson, Stop! Are You Sure You Want to Throw Grandpa's Body Away?, 63
U. MIAMI L. REv. 37, 54 (2008).
39. Futurama: The Honking (FOX television broadcast Nov. 5, 2000).
40. Donaldson v. Lungren, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59, 60 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
41. See Perlin, supra note 25.
42. Id. at 51.
43. Donaldson, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 61, 65.
44. Id. at 60.
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mount to any state interest in maintaining life," Donaldson asked the
court to allow him to do with his body as he wished.4 5 Relying on then-
recent right-to-die cases that held that patients possess a constitutional
right to refuse life-saving medical treatment,4 6 Donaldson argued that
such case law creates a legal fiction that authorizes a form of suicide that
is essentially indistinguishable from the type he wishes to commit.4 7
Recognizing that Donaldson makes a "persuasive argument that his spe-
cific interest in ending his life is more compelling than the state's
abstract interest in preserving life in general,"4 8 and that Donaldson
"may take his own life,"4 9 the Court rejected his right to die by another's
hands, because, by doing so, it would prevent "public officers from per-
forming official acts that they are required by law to perform."o Under
California law, "[t]he coroner is required to inquire into deaths involving
suicide or homicide and to carry out his or her inquiry, may take custody
of the remains and examine the body of a homicide or suicide victim." 5 1
The Court, unwilling to grant Donaldson's petition, stated that such a
matter was better suited for the state's legislature.5 2
No legislation currently exists that would specifically address the
needs of people like Donaldson or our fictional Catherine. Supposing
such legislation was passed, however, the question of how to classify a
cryonic patient's present status must be answered. The next section will
analyze how such a patient's rights and duties would differ according to
the legal status of pre-mortem cryogenically preserved individuals.
1. "THE CAT, IS IT ALIVE OR DEAD? ALIVE OR DEAD?!"5 4
In 1935, physicist Erwin Schr6dinger developed his now-classic
thought experiment as a critique of the Copenhagen interpretation of
quantum mechanics. The experiment involved a hypothetical cat trapped
in a steel chamber along with a Geiger counter containing a small radio-
active substance. Within an hour, the small radioactive substance had an
equal probability of decaying or of remaining constant. If the atomic
substance decays, the counter tube will discharge, and through a relay,
release a hammer that shatters a flask filled with hydrocyanic acid that
45. Id. at 61.
46. Id. (citing Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1986)).
47. "As is often true in times of social transition, case law creates fictions to avoid affronting
previously accepted norms." Id. at 63.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 64.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Perlin, supra note 25, at 37, 52.
54. Futurama: Law and Oracle (Comedy Central television broadcast July 7, 2011).
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will kill the cat. If the substance does not decay, the cat will remain
unharmed. Schr6dinger argued that, according to quantum-mechanic
theorists, the cat is both alive and dead, in equal parts, until the box is
opened and the true state of the cat becomes known.55 The Schrd-
dinger's Cat thought experiment, though absurd by design, presents a
scenario not completely unlike our hypothetical with the fictional char-
acter Catherine.
If Catherine's cryogenically preserved body is deemed "alive" in
the eyes of society and the law, the implications of her existence are
undoubtedly many. For one, how do Catherine's heirs' (or heirs appar-
ent, perhaps) rights change because of Catherine's supposed "life"? The
law has typically limited the rights one has to control one's assets or
property after they meet his or her worldly end. The policy against dead
hand control can be plainly seen by analyzing the Rule Against Perpetu-
ities. The Rule Against Perpetuities, as all law school graduates will
recall, requires that a "contingent future interest must vest, if at all,
within twenty-one years after the expiration of some life in being when
the interest was created."56 The Rule Against Perpetuities thus restricts
dead hand control by requiring that some required event occur within a
set amount of time after the death of all parties to the contract. Such a
restriction poses a philosophical, although not necessarily a practical,
obstacle for Catherine supposing she wishes to financially provide for
her family after her cryonic suspension while wishing to keep open the
possibility of reclaiming her residual assets upon reanimation.
As a practical matter, with proper preparation, Catherine could
avoid the imposition of the Rule Against Perpetuities from spoiling her
estate plan. An antiquated and difficult to understand relic of feudal
law,5 the Rule Against Perpetuities has been significantly modified or
repealed in about one-third of the states. In states that have abrogated
the Rule, courts have upheld the creations of dynasty trusts that allow a
trust to last for centuries, or even, in perpetuity. If Catherine did not
have the foresight to relocate to a state that has abandoned the use of the
Rule Against Perpetuities, the question of whether Catherine will be able
55. John D. Trimmer, The Present Situation in Quantum Mechanics: A Translation of
Schrodinger's "Cat Paradox" Paper, 124 PROC. OF THE AMER. Pin.. Soc'v 323, 328 (1983).
56. Igor Levenberg, Personal Revival Trusts: If You Can't Take It With You, Can You Come
Back to Get It?, 83 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 1469, 1478 (2012) (quoting Jesse Dukeminier & James E.
Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA L. REv. 1303, 1304 (2003)).
57. See Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 690 (Cal. 1961) (holding that an attorney has not
committed legal malpractice by inadvertently violating the Rule Against Perpetuities while
drafting a will because the Rule is so difficult to apply).
58. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 56, at 1314.
59. Note, Dynasty Trusts and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 116 HARv. L. REv. 2588, 2591
(2003).
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to create a trust which provides for her estate to pass through her lineal
heirs but will return to her if she is reanimated becomes uncertain.
Under the Rule Against Perpetuities, a contingent interest must vest
within twenty-one years of all lives in being. 60 The difficulties of classi-
fying Catherine's cryogenic state as a "life in being" have already been
discussed in this article and whether she is or isn't considered a life will
likely be a question left to state legislatures. If she is considered a "life
in being," the trust would be valid under the Rule Against Perpetuities.
If not, then Catherine must seek to secure her estate scheme through the
use of a trust instrument. 6 1
"Personal Revival Trusts," 62 as coined by Igor Levenberg in an arti-
cle penned for the St. John's Law Review, would allow, in theory, for
Catherine, or those in similar positions, to achieve their estate planning
goals, but the law and the legislature may forestall such instruments for
other, practical reasons. Maintaining a trust until science catches up with
science fiction would not only be expensive, but could also potentially
place holds on large sums of wealth for hundreds of years. Such use, or
rather nonuse, of wealth may be deemed against public policy, and with
the ever-increasing uncertainty of the value of U.S. currency, coupled
with inflationary concerns, the creation of such a trust may not, in real-
ity, be a viable option for cryogenically frozen patients.
2. "IT'S A SUPERPOSITION OF BOTH STATES UNTIL YOU OPEN IT
AND COLLAPSE THE WAVE FUNCTION." 6 3
In addition to estate planning problems, there are a host of other
issues that arise from the questionable status of a cryogenically pre-
served person. A full review of such dilemmas is beyond this author's
imagination, but to illustrate how complicated life and the law could
become in a futuristic world, consider how age-dependent restrictions,
duties, or benefits would vary based on what would necessarily be a new
concept of age. Assume that our forty-year-old Catherine was remark-
ably reanimated a mere fifty years after being frozen. Assume also that
her daughter, age eleven, was also frozen at the same time because of
her own health issues. May Catherine, who upon reanimation is legally
ninety years old, collect Social Security Benefits?" May her daughter,
legally aged sixty-one, go to a bar for an alcoholic drink? Would coital
relations with a man she met at the bar be considered a sexual offense?
60. See Levenberg, supra note 56, at 1478.
61. See generally Levenberg, supra note 56.
62. Id.
63. Futurarna: Law and Oracle, supra note 54.
64. It may be science fiction to assume for this hypothetical that Social Security Benefits will
be available in 50 years.
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If the daughter murdered this man after a tryst, would the daughter be
tried as an adult?65
Such questions are innumerable. I challenge my readers to spend a
few minutes in thought to come up with their own absurd results of such
technologies. No matter what question the reader poses, the answer is
undoubtedly unanswerable. Differentiating between legal, biological,
mental, and social ages creates a quandary that will, if such technology
ever becomes viable, undoubtedly be the bane of future generations of
legislatures. However unlikely such technology's existence becomes,
nevertheless, we should not fail to ponder the results. After all, to para-
phrase the words of Professor Farnsworth: Nothing is impossible! Not if
you believe in it. That's what science is all about!66
III. "A CLONE OF MY OWN"
"Look, Professor, I may be identical to you in every possible way but
that doesn't mean I'm anything like you. "6
-Cubert J. Farnsworth
As a scientific reality, cryonics is in its infancy. Though accepted in
some scientific circles, the idea of bringing a person from a lengthy state
of "not-living" to a state of "living" is, with respect to Dr. Ettinger, at
this point still science fiction. The same cannot be said about its theoreti-
cal polar, cloning. Cloning is the scientific creation and reproduction of
an organism, and, unlike cryonics, which implicates principles that are
unknown to mere mortals-such as what, exactly, happens to "us" when
we pass-cloning deals almost entirely with the genetic creation of life,
a topic well understood by the medical and scientific communities.
As a basic primer, humans are made up of a unique set of deoxyri-
bonucleic acid, or DNA.68 When a male's sperm cell enters a female's
unfertilized egg, chromosomes from each are transmitted in equal parts
to the newly fertilized egg, or zygote.6 9 That zygote eventually forms an
embryo, which, you guessed it, contains genes in equal portion from
both its father's sperm cell and mother's egg.70 For our purposes," clon-
65. In my home state of Florida, the answer is likely yes, either way.
66. Futurama: A Clone of My Own (FOX television broadcast Apr. 9, 2000).
67. Id.
68. See Lowell Ben Krahn, Comment, Cloning, Public Policy and the Constitution, 21 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 271, 273 (2003).
69. Id.
70. W. R. PICKER[NG, COMPLETE BIOLOGY 132 (2000).
71. Reproductive cloning is not the only type of cloning being researched, studied, and
attempted by modem science. Therapeutic cloning, for example, is the process of creating clusters
of blastocyst cells through the replacement of the nucleus of an egg with DNA taken from a
somatic cell in order to grow or repair tissues or other organs. Thus, the goal, rather than create a
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ing describes "reproductive cloning," or the artificial replication of con-
ception. Reproductive cloning allows scientists, through a process called
somatic cell nuclear transfer, or "SCNT," to "take a newly fertilized egg
and inject it with DNA from a somatic cell (a cell other than a sperm or
egg) and thus produce a clone."72 Through chemical or electrical stimu-
lation, the reconstructed egg divides, and is then transferred to a female
host's uterus, where it incubates until birth." The result of this process
is the creation of an organism that is genetically identical to its donor,
creating a child that is, technically, the twin of its donor.74
Though controversial, this process has netted positive scientific
results. Since 1997, scientists have successfully been able to clone ani-
mals such as sheep, pigs, cows, mice, cats, and rabbits. Using these
same principles, scientists are currently researching and, in some cases,
actively attempting, human cloning." With breakthroughs in the fields
of genetics and reproductive technologies bringing us closer and closer
to the reality of human cloning, we must reexamine the laws, ethics, and
philosophies implicit to the creation of human life and the ownership of
one's genetic materials."
Cubert J. Farnsworth, the fictional, cloned Futurama character, may
provide an accurate illustration of what such scientific advancements
could mean for society, ethics, and the law. As the self-described great-
est invention of Professor Hubert J. Farnsworth, Cubert was formed
from cells taken from one of the 159-year-old Professor's "shapelier
growths on [his] back."" Twelve-year-old Cubert is unique to Professor
Farnsworth in both appearance and intellect, and possesses none of the
sterile or robotic characteristics so often imagined when human cloning
genetically identical organism, is to create cells, tissues, or other materials that contain the same
genetic identity of a host. This would make it possible for organ transplantation and other
therapeutic treatments that pose the risk of a body's rejection of outside material to be much more
efficient and likely of success, as the transplanted organ or material would be identical to the host.
A discussion regarding the legal and moral implications of such type of cloning is not within the
scope of this paper and will not be contemplated further. For more information, see PRINCIPLES OF
CLONING (Jose Cibelli, et al. eds., 2002).
72. Krahn, supra note 68, at 273.
73. Id.
74. Learn.Genetics, What is Cloning? UNIv. OF UTAH, http://learn.genetics.utah.edulcontent/
tech/cloning/whatiscloning/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2013).
75. Krahn, supra note 68, at 274.
76. Maverick Doctor Claims to Have Implanted Women with Cloned Human Embryos, THE
TELEGRAPH (Apr. 22, 2009 6:33 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/5197424/
Maverick-doctor-claims-to-have-implanted-women-with-cloned-human-embryos.html (last visited
Apr. 1, 2013).
77. For a recent Supreme Court opinion about the ownership of genetic material that will
surely be the subject of much debate, see Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,
133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
78. Futurama: A Clone of My Own, supra note 66.
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is discussed." Through Cubert, the professor is provided with not only
an heir to the Planet Express fortune, but also the emotional fulfillments
of fatherhood, as well as a viable source of organs, if needed.so
A. "Illegal copies never hurt anybody"8 1
In the Futurama universe, cloning is a seemingly legal and, if not
mundane, certainly uncontroversial activity.82 The same cannot be said
in our modem era, where the legality of human cloning is not necessar-
ily clear and certainly not uncontroversial. Human cloning implicates
matters of religion, privacy, reproductive rights, and access to scientific
research, among others, and, as such, it is unsurprising that a consensus
on the issue has not been reached among the States and Federal
Government.83
At the time of this writing, no federal legislation has been passed
that would directly prohibit scientists from attempting or researching
human cloning.84 Legislation that would impose such a ban, however,
has been introduced in the past. In 2003, for instance, The Human Clon-
ing Prohibition Act of 2003 was introduced, and approved, by the House
of Representatives." Openly supported by then President Bush, the Bill
proposed to ban all human cloning "either to bring [a] child to live birth
or to use [a] cloned human embryo for experimental research that neces-
sarily results in the death of the young embryo."86 Despite strong sup-
port by House Conservatives, the 2003 Bill failed to gain support in the
more centrist Senate and was never put to a vote.
In 2007, another Bill, The Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2007,
79. See, e.g., THE STEPFORD WIVES (Paramount Pictures 2004); STAR WARS: EPISODE 11 -
ArACK OF THE CLONES (20th Century FOX 2002); INVASION OF THE BODY SNATCHERS (United
Artists 1978).
80. Futurama: A Clone of My Own, supra note 66.
81. Futurama: I Dated a Robot (FOX television broadcast May 13, 2001).
82. Futurama: Rebirth (Comedy Central television broadcast June 24, 2010).
Fry: Fetal stem cells? Aren't those controversial?
Professor Farnsworth: In your time, yes, but nowadays, shut up! Besides, these are adult stem
cells, harvested from perfectly healthy adults, whom I killed for their stems cells.
83. Susan K. Kendall, Laws and Public Policy about Cloning, MICH. STATE UNIV. LIBRARY,
http://staff.1ib.msu.edu/skendall/cloning/laws.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2013).
84. While the Federal Government has never outright prohibited stem cell research, a Bush
directive prohibited the use of federal funds to support stem cell research in 2001. In 2009,
President Obama changed course, announcing that he and his administration "will vigorously
support scientists who pursue this research." See Obama Ends Stem Cell Research Ban, CBS
NEWS (June 18, 2009, 6:27 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-503767_162-4853385.html.
85. Kendall, supra note 83.
86. Human Cloning Prohibition Act, NCHLA.ORG, http://www.nchla.org/datasource/idocu
ments/hr534.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2013).
87. Kendall, supra note 83.
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was introduced in the House."' Unlike its 2003 counterpart, however, the
2007 version was rejected by House members who feared the Bill only
placed a "phony ban" on human cloning and would not, in actuality,
prohibit all forms of cloning, such as therapeutic cloning related to stem
cell research."
At the state level, only fifteen states have passed legislation regard-
ing the legality of reproductive cloning.9 0 Of the fifteen, thirteen states,
California, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Connecticut,
Arkansas, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, North Dakota, South
Dakota, and Virginia currently have placed bans on reproductive clon-
ing.91 Two states, Arizona and Missouri, allow reproductive human
cloning, but prohibit the use of state funds to finance research that seeks
to develop human embryotic production. 92 Six states, California, Con-
necticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, and New Jersey, permit
cloning for the limited purpose of scientific research.93 Rhode Island
passed legislation prohibiting human cloning, but it lapsed in 2010.94
Evidently, because the states' laws vary as to what exactly is per-
mitted in terms of human embryotic cloning, the legality of this process
is largely dependent upon where the creation of the cloned embryo takes
place. Because there currently exists a schema in at least some states that
places regulations on the right to artificially conceive a cloned child, and
because the Federal Government has previously tried to place an out-
right ban on such activity, we must analyze whether either an outright or
even a limited ban on reproductive cloning is permissible under the U.S.
Constitution.
B. "I happen to know a place where the Constitution
doesn't mean squat!"9 '
The Supreme Court has declared there to be a protected, fundamen-
tal right of an individual's privacy in matters of procreation, contracep-
tion, and family. 96 Guaranteed under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments, neither the state nor the Federal Govern-
ment may deprive an individual of "life, liberty, or property without due
88. Id.
89. House Turns Back 'Phony' Cloning Ban, BAPTIST PRESS (Jan. 7, 2007), http://www.bp
news.net/bpnews.asp?id=25810.
90. Human Cloning Laws, NCSL.ORG, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/human-





95. Futurama: A Taste of Freedom (FOX television broadcast Dec. 22, 2002).
96. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). See also Krahn, supra note 68, at 288.
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process of law."97 As the Supreme Court explained in Eisenstadt v.
Baird, the constitutional guarantee of privacy as related to matters of
procreation and family planning, protects "the right of [an] individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether
to bear or beget a child."9 8 This is because, as the Court said in Skinner
v. Oklahoma-where the Court declared a law requiring the mandatory
sterilization of certain felons unconstitutional-"[m]arriage and procre-
ation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race."99
The Court has never directly addressed whether the rights guaran-
teed under the Constitution or Bill of Rights to "bear or beget a child"
exclude such "artificial methods" as cloning. It is likely, however, that
the Court's precedent is not intended to be construed as such. Absent
from any of the Court's decisions interpreting the right to procreate is
language that would act to limit or directly omit human reproductive
cloning, or other "unnatural" forms of procreation, from constitutional
protection.100
Although legal commentators are not in agreement as to whether
the Court has implicitly given scientists and would-be-donors the green
light when it comes to such artificial means of genetic replication,' 0
distinguishing such fundamental constitutional rights based on the medi-
cal process involved might be contrary to the very guarantees recognized
by the Court. The Supreme Court, in its right-to-procreate line of cases,
guaranteed the result of conception, that is, the right of parenthood and
procreation. The Court said nothing to suggest that those rights are, in
any way, dependent on the process employed to achieve those results.
It is the opinion of this author that, if the time comes, the Court will
hold that the right to have and raise a child is not dependent on whether
the child was conceived by natural or artificial means. Regardless of any
decision by the courts, there very well may come a day where, because
either (a) the right to reproductive cloning was constitutionally upheld;
(b) clones were produced in the United States illegally; or (c) clones
created internationally were brought or moved to the United States, that
the law and society may be forced to deal with the consequences of
having such "individuals" among us.
97. US CONST. amends. V, XIV.
98. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
99. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
100. Krahn, supra note 68, at 292. See also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
101. See, e.g., Clark D. Forsythe, Human Cloning and the Constitution, 32 VAL. U. L. REV.
469 (1998).
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C. "My little clone "102
As addressed in Part II, a complete discussion of a technological
advancement's-in this case, human cloning-impact on modem soci-
ety is unfathomable. As such, this section is intended to serve more as
the start of a discussion about cloning's consequences on law and soci-
ety, rather than a comprehensive dialogue.
To begin this analysis, let us consider Cubert and set up some basic
parameters for our discussion. Cubert, like all children, is an individual
with rights and responsibilities. In other words, he is autonomous and
his freedom is protected just as any other individual's freedom is pro-
tected under the U.S. Constitution. We are, therefore, not contemplating
the possibility that our society will somehow view clones as, in any way,
the "property" of their donor. As such, our notions of individuality and
autonomy will remain unchanged on a legal level, though perhaps not on
a philosophical level.103
I hypothesize that a clone will be, for all intents and purposes,
viewed by society and the law as the child of its donor, and its donor
will be responsible for his or her clone in the same way parents are
responsible for their children.' 04 Under this rubric, and allowing the
assumption that clones are entitled to the same constitutional protections
and rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness that all individuals
are entitled to, the more absurd implications of human cloning are
avoided. A donor will not be permitted to create an army of slaves from
his or her genetic material,' will be unable to use clones as a source of
forced organ donation, and will not, as described in the Futurama epi-
sode "Overclockwise," be able to escape criminal liability under princi-
ples of Double Jeopardy.10 6 The impact of human cloning, I suggest,
rather than affecting a societal understanding of individuality and free-
dom, will force practical changes in how society and the law address
issues related to fertility, parenthood, and heirdom. 107
102. Futurama: A Clone of My Own, supra note 66.
103. The author imagines it would be quite an identity crisis to realize that you are-
biologically, at least-not unique. As a society we tend to believe that our existence was
predetermined and that we, individually, are special. Biological reproduction serves to enforce this
notion. If not for the two individuals that happen to be our parents meeting and getting together,
we would not exist. The odds in favor of our existence, in such a view, are astronomical. If it were
discovered that the exact genetic makeup of what makes us "us" were not only predetermined, but
also concocted in a lab, one may begin to question the value of his or her life. Such a discovery is
a commonly used plot device in science fiction. For my favorite example, see MooN (Stage 6
Films 2009).
104. As discussed below, however, such a postulation creates its own practical problems.
105. No more so than any parent has the right to control his or her minor child.
106. Futurama: Overclockwise (Comedy Central television broadcast Sept. 1, 2011).
107. The implications of cloning may be far more reaching than this author can imagine;
however, for this article, I will limit cloning's implications to the boundaries of my imagination.
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1. "THERE GOES MY DNA. WHAT A DISGUSTING
AND BEAUTIFUL PROCESS."l 0 8
Whether the desire to procreate is solely or partially the result of
evolutionary biology, societal pressure, or religious mandates, human
cloning will, at its most basic level, help people achieve this goal. As a
reproductive technology, human cloning would allow those traditionally
shut out of parenthood to not only become parents, but biological par-
ents.109 Political debates concerning the make-up of the ideal family
aside, for many, because of infertility, sexuality, or the desire to raise a
child without a partner, the current available parenting options may not
be ideal.
With the availability of new procreative technologies, however,
come new concerns regarding parental rights and responsibilities. Bio-
logical procreation has a physical barrier to entry, and requires at least
some active participation by would-be parents. This required participa-
tion makes the current schema of, let's call it, "no-fault parenthood"
possible. Whether a couple intends to become pregnant or not is of no
concern to modern courts when determining parental responsibility. The
mere act of sexual intercourse creates the possibility that a child may be
conceived, and as modern society cannot punish the child for the unin-
tended consequences of his or her parents' intended actions, responsibil-
ity flows, uncontroversially, from biology. However, with the advent of
human cloning, a person can parent a child biologically without any par-
ticipation in the child's procreation.
As humans we discard our DNA with abandon. Unintended, we
shed hair and skin cells, and leave saliva and other forms of genetic
materials around our inhabited world. From a theoretical standpoint, any
of these discarded forms of DNA could, if properly preserved, be used to
produce a human clone. This potentially leaves the entire population
subject to parental extortion. As such, the regularly used means of deter-
mining paternity-a DNA test-may not be the best means of delegat-
ing parental responsibility in the future. As a society we must attempt to
find a solution that allows children to be provided for, regardless of
whether their birth was planned by their parents, but also protects par-
ents from being financially responsible for children they created due to
no other reason than their discarded DNA was targeted for nefarious
purposes.
What the solution to this problem is, this author cannot contem-
plate. The concept of bastard children, not recognized under the law, has
108. Futurama: Kif Gets Knocked Up a Notch (FOX television broadcast Jan. 12, 2003).
109. See PRINCIPLES OF CLONING, supra note 71, at 478.
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long been abandoned, and treating illegitimate children differently from
their legitimate siblings has been found to violate the Equal Protection
Clause.'1 o However, to not recognize the passive nature of such chil-
dren's conception, and to allow these children to demand support, and
possibly an intestate share of their biological parent's estate, seems
unfair to not only their biological parent, but also to the other benefac-
tors of their parent's estate.
IV. CONCLUSION: A BIG WARNING
Good science fiction should leave its reader with more questions
than answers. Such is the nature of a genre that attempts to address
moral and ethical quandaries realistically through plot devices that are
intended to be otherworldly, futuristic, or decidedly unrealistic. In keep-
ing with theme, therefore, it is this author's hope that his readers feel, at
least a little, unfulfilled. The topics dealt with in this article-cryonics
and cloning-are fantastical in nature, but are being studied by serious
minds in the hope that such technologies become realities. As they are
not realities, discussions concerning the consequences of such technolo-
gies are, in a sense, hyperbolic. That the problems may be exaggerated,
however, does not mean there is no value or fun in contemplating
solutions.
Literature and research regarding the hypothetical eventualities of
scientific discoveries are necessary for if or when such discoveries
become realities and the government and society have to address the
changing realities of modem life. That this paper was centered on Matt
Groening's Futurama, a ridiculous little cartoon about the 31st Century,
is of little consequence. The show is merely a framing device used to
present topics generally not discussed in modem society.' The discus-
sion is by no means complete, and undoubtedly, will never be complete.
I urge likeminded readers to continue to explore the annals of science
fiction and contemplate what they see as the possible results of their own
favorite authors or creators. How useful such exercise will be, and in
fact, this exercise has been, will be determined by future generations.
But "[w]ith a warning label this big, you know they gotta be fun."I 12
110. See generally Lili Mostofi, Legitimizing the Bastard: The Supreme Court's Treatment of
the Illegitimate Child, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUEs 453 (2004).
Ill. Also, a not-so-unintended consequence of using Futurama as a framing device for a law
review article was that it became a convenient way for me, an adult with a graduate degree, to
justify spending hundreds of dollars and hours on and watching DVDs of a cartoon.
112. Futurama: Three Hundred Big Boys (FOX television broadcast June 15, 2003).
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